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Abstract 
 
 
A  Study on the Indonesian Financial Sector 
By 
Seunghwon Yang 
 
 
 
This  thesis  examines  the  structure  of  the  Indonesian  financial  
sector, the  process  of  reforms,  before  and  after  the  financial  
crisis  and  suggestions   to  restore  the  positive  functions  in  the  
financial  industry. 
 
The  Indonesian  financial  industry  has  been  predominated  by  the  
banking  sector.  The  banking  sector  consists  of  the  central  
bank(Bank  Indonesia),  state-owned  commercial  banks,  private  
commercial  banks,  foreign  banks,  joint  venture  banks,  province  
development  banks  and  a  countless  number  of  Bank  Perkreditan  
Rakyats(villiage  banks) 
 
The  Indonesian  financial  system  has  moved  toward  a  more  
market-based  system  since  the  early  1980’s.  A  series  of  reforms  
liberalized  the   interest  rate,  entry  of  new  banks,  branching,  and  
so  on. Reforms  have  changed  the  Indonesian  economy  substantially.  
As  a  result,  the  reforms  became  one  of  the  most  important  
causes  of  the  Indonesian  financial  crisis  in  1997  because  the  
liberalization  occurred  too  fast  compared  to   the  reality  of  the  
Indonesian  economy. 
 
The  reforms  triggered  the  increase  in  the  inflow  of  foreign  
capital,  especially  short-term  external  capital.  The  Indonesian  
financial  system  was  not  equipped  with  good  infrastructure  to  
protect itself  from  external  shock. 
 
The  Indonesian  foreign  exchange  rate  system  had  an  intervention  
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band  and  the  Indonesian  Rupia’s  value  was  closely  connected  
with  the  US  dollar.  The  external  competitiveness  of  the  
Indonesian  economy  was  critically  impaired  when  the  Chinese  
Yuan  and  the  Japanese  Yen  depreciated  in  mid-1990’s.  The  
weakness  of  the  low  external  competitiveness  snowballed  into  a  
deficit  of  current  account  and  foreign  debts.   
 
The  non-performing  loans  of  Indonesian  banks  have  increased  
rapidly  during  the  1990’s  due  to  the  lack  of  capability  of  the  
Indonesian  financial  institutions  to  analyze  customer’s  credit  and  
the  feasibility  of  projects.  Furthermore,  excessive  competition  among  
financial  institutions,  abundant  liquidity  caused  by  foreign  capital  
inflow,  the  principal-agency  problem  of  some  private  banks  of  
big  conglomerates  and  the  long-term  economic  boom  deluded  the  
financial  institutions. 
 
Indonesia  has  pursued  a  balanced  budget.  The  Indonesian  
government  has  made  its  best  efforts  to  decrease  the  budget  
deficit.  However,  it  was  not  effective  because  there  were  too  
many  exceptions  such  as  strategic  industries,  and  so  on. 
 
The  Indonesian  government  requested  the  IMF  rescue  package  
and  an  IMF  rescue  package  program  totalling  in  the  amount  of  
40 billion  US  dollars  was  signed  in  November  1997.  The  IMF  
requested  the  Indonesian  government  to  implement  a  fiscal  
stabilization  program  and  also  to  restructure  the  banking  sector.  
The  main  purposes  of  reforms  were  the  stabilization  of  the  
Rupia  and  the  restoration  of  confidence  in  the  Indonesian  banks  
from  the  international  financial  market. 
 
The  Bank  Indonesia’s  banking  sector  reforms  are  focusing  on  
re-capitalization,  improvement  of  prudential  regulation,  reform  of  the  
bankruptcy  law,  merger,  suspense  and  take-over  of  unsound  
banks. 
 
My  suggestions  on  ways  to  improve  the  banking  system  are  
as  follows. 
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First,  the  evaluation  of  the  bank  personnel  should  be  measured  
by  their  performance. 
 
Second,  the  banking  system  should  be  transformed  from  a  
highly  hierarchical  generalist  organization  to  a  flat  expert  
organization. 
 
Third,  it  is  extremely  important  to  establish  justice  in  the  
economic  system.  The  defaulted  borrower  should  be  severely  
punished. 
 
1 
Chapter I.  Introduction 
 
 
1. Purpose of the Thesis 
 
Notwithstanding much controversy, many people have praised the East Asian 
economic miracle just until a year and a half ago.  The East Asian countries 
collapsed suddenly with no due notice.  What makes it more notable for 
Indonesia is that it had retained a very sound economic situation.  But there 
were many hidden reasons that caused the Indonesian economy to go bankrupt.  
It was the financial sector, or more specifically, the banking sector.  The 
collapse of the Korean economy was very similar to the Indonesian case.  The 
people of Indonesia and Korea have suffered greatly.  The Indonesian people 
have undergone hardship, such as, unemployment, poverty, ethnic conflicts, 
political instability, etc.  What were the reasons behind the suffering of such a 
large number of people? 
 
The weakness in the financial sector of Indonesia began to grow as a result of 
the reform of its banking system in June 1983, by liberalizing interest rates and 
by the complicated & selective credit policy with subsidized interest rates.  In 
addition, the elements of the financial repression disappeared with the 
introduction of market liberalization in October 1988.  Such reforms gave a 
severe impact on the Indonesian economy. 
 
? The banking reforms have caused excessive credit expansion by the banking 
system because many financial institutions emerged with the removal of entry 
barriers. 
 
? There was rapid increase in bank liabilities following the serious maturity and 
currency mismatches. 
 
? The banks had poorly capitalized financial structure. 
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? The Indonesian government was heavily involved in a selection of credit 
customer.  It distorted the economic principle and resulted in political corruption. 
 
? There was a lack of prudent and credible administrative institutions or 
regulations. Indonesia lacked a sufficient financial infrastructure required to 
absorb the highly open and self-regulated banking system. 
 
? The central bank, i.e., the Bank Indonesia, was not able to function as a 
competent lender to which companies could turned to as the last resort. Korea 
liberalized its financial sectors and opened the capital market without enough 
preparation required. However, the Korean economy basically did not have the 
strong financial basis, similar to the case of Indonesia 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to study the factors that caused the Indonesian 
financial crisis, especially those related to the banking sector, and reforms which 
were adopted and are expected to direct the financial sector in playing a proper 
role in the national economy. 
 
In particular, I would like to study the following issues: 
 
? What is the current situation of the Indonesian banks? 
 
? How did the Indonesian banks play a role in the preceding Indonesian foreign 
exchange and economic crisis. 
 
? What roles played by the financial sectors are expected to help overcome the 
current economic difficulties and prevent the next economic crisis? 
 
In conclusion, my ultimate goal is to find the direction for Korean banking sector, 
by examining the problems of the Indonesian banking sector and the expected 
reforms 
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2. Organization of the Thesis  
 
The organization of the thesis is as followsL: 
 
Chapter I will cover the purpose and overview of this thesis 
 
Chapter II will examine the structure of the financial industry, monetary policy and 
the securities market.  This chapter will focus on explaining the distinctive 
characteristics of the financial system and serial financial system reforms, which 
later triggered the financial crisis. 
 
Chapter III will analyze the Indonesian financial crisis in connection with the 
problems of the financial system. 
 
Chapter IV is the conclusion.  In this chapter, I will review the thesis briefly and 
give my opinion on the core problems of the financial system in Indonesia and 
Korea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Chapter II. Financial System in Indonesia 
 
 
1.  Structure of the Indonesian Banking Industry 
 
a.  The Banking System 
 
The Indonesian banking system had incorporated a strict regulation on entry, 
interest rate, foreign exchange transaction, reserve requirements, establishment 
of branches, and so on.  Some serial financial reforms, i.e., liberalization of 
interest rates, elimination of credit ceilings and introduction of indirect monetary 
instruments since 1983 had released a number of regulations.  The Indonesian 
banking system can generally be divided into three parts, such as, the Bank 
Indonesia, state-owned banks and private commercial banks. 
 
 
  Ο The Bank Indonesia 
 
 
The Bank Indonesia is the central bank of the Republic of Indonesia.  The Bank 
Indonesia controls the overall financial system and has responsibility as being the 
lender of the last resort.  Although the Ministry of Finance has authority to grant 
and revoke bank licenses, the Bank Indonesia has authority over the bank 
supervision and regulation.  The Bank Indonesia has adopted a supervisory 
system similar to the U.S. CAMEL system (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, and Liquidity) and annual on-site examination of banks.  The 
major functions of the Bank Indonesia are as follows: 
 
First, it controls the aggregate amount of liquidity and stability of the currency, the 
Rupia, through the reserve deposit. 
 
Second, it endeavors to contribute in supporting the productivity and 
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development of every economic sector. 
 
Third, it supervises and regulates all the financial institutes except the insurance 
companies. 
 
Fourth, it issues money and holds the official foreign reserve. 
 
Lastly, it develops and implements monetary policies according to the decision of 
the Economic Stabilization Committee. 
 
 
  Ο The State-Owned Banks 
 
The state-owned banks have been dominant players in the banking industry, 
though domestic private banks and joint venture banks with foreign banks have 
grown rapidly in recent years.  Initially, business areas of state-owned banks 
were restricted to their traditionally specialized areas pursuant to the Bank Act of 
1968.  The Banking Act of 1968, which was replaced by the Banking Law of 
1992, defined the major areas of concentration for each stated-owned bank.  In 
practice, this restriction was not strictly implemented.  The new banking law that 
was introduced in October of 1988 released a functional specialization for state-
owned banks.  In addition, the Bank Act No.7 of 1992 converted the state-
owned banks to limited liability companies and allowed them to lend to non-
priority sectors.  Although the distinction has faded after the reform of the bank 
law, the seven state-owned banks consist of five sectarian banks, a developed 
bank and a savings bank.  Specifically, they are, Bank BNI, Bank Dagang 
Negara(BDN), Bank Bumi Daya(BBD), Bank Rakyat Indonesia(BRI), Bank 
Ekspore Impore Indonesia(Bank Eksim), a development bank, Bank 
Pembanguman, and a saving bank, Bank Tabungan Negara(BTN).  The state-
owned banks possess a number of problems, such as, overstaff in-efficiencies 
and under-capitalization.  Despite the fact that state-owned banks legitimately 
became private entities pursuant to the new bank law, the Ministry of Finance 
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announced that no state-owned banks might default on its obligation under the 
government umbrella.  In fact, the government still maintains the majority of the 
stockholders and intervenes in every function of the bank, especially in the 
decision process of fund distribution and personnel affairs.  Such environment 
caused the state-owned banks to become morally hazardous and inefficient. 
 
The main role of Bank BNI is to support the development project relating to 
industry, agriculture, transportation and export of domestic commodities. 
 
Bank Dagang Negara(BDN) supports the mining industry and export industry 
 
Bank Bumi Daya(BBD)’s specialty is to support the agriculture, forestry and 
plantation 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is responsible for the development of rural areas 
and their residents. 
 
Bank Ekspore Impor Indonesia (Bank Ekxim) is a specialized bank for 
international trade 
 
The 27 province governments own the Regional Development Banks (RDB) that 
operates as the commercial bank or fiscal agent. 
.  
 
  ? Private Banks 
 
Indonesia has a very generous policy in establishing a financial institute.  The 
banking industry reforms of 1988 lifted many restrictions.  The policy of the low 
barrier to enter has resulted in a surprising increase in the number of banks.  
The number of banks reached about 240 in March 1994.  Almost all of the large 
business conglomerates and many pension funds of state-owned companies 
have their own banks.  Though Korea had a 2.5 times bigger scale of economy 
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than that of Indonesia before the foreign exchange crisis in 1997, Korea now has 
only 26 banks.  At present day, the Indonesian authorities place stricter limits on 
the granting of new license in order to stabilize the financial situation and to 
prevent newly established banks from going bankrupt. Commercial banks are not 
allowed to engage in securities undertaking, brokerage or trading.  As a result, 
many banks established subsidiary companies to participate in the securities 
markets.  The regulation to limit the extent of business areas of commercial 
banks precipitated the emergence of financial conglomerates.   
 
There were 77 licensed foreign exchange banks as of December 1995.  The 
requirements for domestic foreign exchange banks to open branch offices 
overseas have been relaxed.  Twenty Indonesian foreign exchange banks have 
branch offices and representative offices in 14 foreign countries.  All of these 
banks have off-shore banking units in the Cayman and the Cook island.  The 
main operations of foreign exchange banks are presumed to be to launder 
obscure and illegitimate transactions of their customers at home. 
 
Foreign banks can establish banks through a joint venture with local banks and 
the acquisition of shares of domestic banks that are floating in the stock market.  
The foreign banks may hold a maximum equity ownership of 80 percent.  The 
only way for the foreign banks to do so is through a joint venture.  The 
Indonesian authorities prohibited foreign banks from establishing wholly owned 
subsidiaries.  In addition, the Indonesian authorities imposed a higher initial 
capital requirement on foreign banks compared to that of newly established 
domestic banks.  The private national banks may open branch offices anywhere 
in Indonesia and the requirements for domestic foreign exchange banks to open 
branch offices overseas have been relaxed.  However, foreign banks and joint 
venture banks whose operations were confined to activities conducted within 
Jakarta may still open sub-branches in seven other major areas.  The main 
customers of joint venture banks and foreign banks are generally multinational 
companies from their own countries.  The American companies are engaged in 
the natural resource sector while Japanese companies and ANIEs (Asian New 
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Industrializing Economics) are mainly related to non-oil manufacturing sectors.  
Many newly established joint venture banks are associated with the Japanese 
banks.  The American banks have secured major customers and retail markets 
through their advanced technology, products and networks.  One of the most 
important roles of foreign banks are, coordinating the private sectors’ loans to 
Indonesian companies and government, and acting as a channel for obtaining 
assistance in official development from their respective governments and from 
multinational institutes. 
 
There are about 8,000 villages or regional banks in Indonesia.  These banks 
are Bank Perkeditan Rakyat (BPR), which may not even have branch networks 
nor issue demand deposits.  Their asset portfolio, especially in deposit accounts, 
is severely limited.  Accordingly, it is highly vulnerable to solvency.  These 
banks represent an aspect of instability in the Indonesian financial system.   
 
 b. Characteristics of the Banking Industry 
 
  ? Composition of the Banking System 
 
 
The banking system holds a core position in the Indonesian financial system in 
terms of total assets and the number of offices.  Although the NBFIs including 
securities companies, leasing companies, insurance companies and pension 
funds have grown rapidly in recent years, the banking system had held over 90 
percent of the gross assets in the financial system in 1991. 
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Table 1.  
Structure and Growth of the Financial Sectors, 1969-94 
 
Number Shares in assets(%) Assets growth  
1982 1988 1994 1982 1988 1994 ‘83-
‘88 
‘89-
‘91 
‘92-
‘94 
Bank 
Indonesia 
1 1 1 42.4 36.8 21.3 18.8 9.2 6.6 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
118 111 240 52.8 56.8 78.7 22.4 32.6 37.4 
NBFIs 113 202 n.a. 4.5 5.8 n.a. 30.1 33.6 n.a. 
Others 5,808 5,783 n.a. 0.3 0.6 n.a. 33.4 15.9 n.a. 
Total 6,040 6,097 241 100 100 100 21.2 21.3 29.0 
Source: 1. Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Statistics and Annual Reports    
      2.Department of Finance, Statistics of the Finance Companies,1991               
3.WIDER, Research for Action 27, The Banking System and Monetary 
Aggregates Following Financial Sector Reforms, Lesson from Indonesia, 
Anwar Nasution. 
 
In particular, state-owned banks have held the largest portion in the banking 
system.  Although the assets of private banks surpassed those of state-owned 
banks after the reform of the banking system in the 1990’s, the state-owned 
banks still maintain their dominant status in the Indonesian banking system 
 
Table 2. 
Market Share of Banking Institutes by Ownership 
                                    (unit: percentage of total) 
 1988 1991 1993 1994 1995 
Asset      
  State-owned banks 63.0 45.2 41.8 38.7 36.9 
  Private Forex banks 16.0 29.4 34.8 38.7 39.6 
  Private Non-Forex banks 7.9 8.3 5.8 5.6 5.7 
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  Joint Venture banks 5.1 7.8 8.4 8.7 8.8 
  Development banks 8.0 9.3 9.2 8.3 9.0 
      
Loan      
  State-owned banks 54.4 41.5 39.9 35.2 33.4 
  Private Forex banks 19.6 31.3 37.5 41.6 41.8 
  Private Non-Forex banks 11.1 9.5 6.8 6.0 6.3 
  Joint Venture banks 5.4 7.9 8.2 8.0 8.7 
  Development banks 9.5 9.8 8.6 9.1 9.8 
      
Saving & Time Deposits      
  State-owned banks 58.7 42.6 39.9 34.7 33.2 
  Private Forex banks 21.3 37.3 41.7 46.7 49.2 
  Private Non-Forex banks 12.5 12.8 9.9 9.0 7.7 
  Joint Venture banks 3.7 2.9 1.8 2.6 2.2 
  Development banks 3.8 4.4 6.7 7.0 7.7 
 1988 1991 1993 1994 1995 
Demand Deposits      
  State-owned banks 54.3 38.3 32.3 31.1 32.4 
  Private Forex banks 17.4 34.5 43.2 43.1 43.7 
  Private Non-Forex banks 12.0 11.9 8.2 7.7    7.3 
  Joint Venture banks 4.3 3.9 5.5 4.5 4.8 
  Development banks 12.0 11.5 10.8 13.6 11.8 
      
Total Deposits      
  State-owned banks 57.5 41.5 38.3 33.9 33.0 
  Private Forex banks 20.2 36.6   42.0 45.9   48.1 
  Private Non-Forex banks 12.4 12.6 9.5 8.7 7.6 
  Joint Venture banks 3.8 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.8 
  Development banks 6.1 6.1 7.6 8.5 8.5 
Notes: 1. Some non-foreign exchange banks became foreign exchange banks 
in this period 
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2. The state-owned Bapindo is included in the category of Development 
banks 
 
Sources: 1. Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
2. WIDER, Research for Action 27, The Banking System and 
Monetary Aggregates Following Financial Sector Reforms, Lesson 
from Indonesia, 
 
 
The Indonesian financial authorities have implemented various financial reforms 
since 1983 for the purpose of lifting the numerous restrictions on the banking 
system.  There were no competent or prudent supervisory institutes, nor a 
sound system, which could have brought a healthy development of the banking 
system. To be specific, the Indonesian financial system had not been equipped 
with a sound infrastructure to digest advanced reforms.   
 
The banking sector had to lower the credit standard due to severe competition 
provoked by the deregulation and continued to operate on the basis of the 
already outdated principles under the previous financial repression.  Their 
valuation practices were mainly based on the historical book records instead of 
market value or quality of collateral.  Credit risks and interest risk were not 
sufficiently considered.   
 
Banking regulation and supervision were enforced, which generally focused on 
judicial compliance rather than on risk evaluation of individual banks.  A more 
restrictive CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning, 
Liquidity) system and annual on-site examination of banks for regulating and 
supervising were introduced in February 1991, i.e., after more than 2 years 
since the introduction of the drastic banking reforms in October 1988. Above all, 
these problems imply that lending limits were abolished without any safety 
measures.  As a result, the fragile infrastructure caused a huge amount of 
NPLs (Non-Performing Loans) of banks.  The NPLs problem of state-owned 
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banks was at a serious level.  It can be shown by the recovery case of 
Bapindo, which had built-up overwhelming percentage of NPLs. 
 
Table 3. 
Commercial Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, 1993-95 
                                  (unit: percent of total credit) 
 1993 1994 1995 
All banks(%) 
Non-performing 
Bad 
 
14.2 
3.3 
 
12.1 
4.0 
 
10.4 
3.3 
State-owned banks 
Non-performing 
Bad 
 
19.8 
4.0 
 
18.6 
5.9 
 
16.6 
5.3 
Private banks 
Non-performing 
Bad 
 
7.3 
2.1 
 
5.4 
1.9 
 
4.9 
1.4 
Total Credit(trillion Rupia) 
  State-owned banks 
Private banks 
177.5 
99.1 
79.8 
217.0 
101.1 
108.5 
267.8 
    120.9 
141.3 
Note: 1. Bad loans are the lowest quality of the three categories of non- 
      performing loans, which are sub-standard, doubtful and loss 
 
Source: 1. Bank Indonesia, World Bank 
2. IMF Working Paper, The Indonesian Financial System, John 
Montgomery 
 
Under-capitalization of banks and non-compliance with certain important rules 
demonstrate further serious problems of the Indonesian banking system. The 
Indonesian financial authorities were not able to improve nor forcefully and 
consistently implement their policies due to without necessary regulation 
regarding under-capitalization of banks. 
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Table 4.  
Number of Banks in Non-Compliance with Prudential Rules, 1995 
 
 Total number 
in category 
Capital 
adequacy ratio 
Legal lending 
limit 
Loan-deposit 
ratio 
State-owned banks 
Private banks 
Local development  
         banks 
Joint venture banks 
7 
166 
27 
 
40 
0 
18 
2 
 
1 
2 
56 
3 
 
9 
1 
11 
0 
 
6 
 240 21 70 18 
Source: Bank Indonesia, reported in “banks suffer U$4.5bn in bad loans,  
      Indonesian Observer, January 26,1996, and Report of the Financial Year  
      1994/95. 
 
Most large banks are closely connected to the Indonesian private conglomerates.  
This situation has produced many problems for a long period of time.  These 
banks are not able to evaluate their sister companies on a commercial basis.  It 
also caused a moral hazard for both banks and their sister companies, enabling 
the raising of funds without much effort. 
 
  Ο Inefficiencies in the Banking System 
 
The Indonesian banking system had been comprised of many under-capitalized 
banks since the serial-banking reforms were enacted in 1980’s, because many 
initial obligations required for the establishment had been lifted.  This resulted in 
the emergence of a number of problems which adversely affected the efficiency 
of the banking system 
 
First, the under-capitalized banks tend to pursue high yield and high -risk assets 
since they are unable to raise funds with low cost.  Furthermore, even if they fail 
to indemnify their liabilities, the government gives an implicit guarantee of 
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protection. There is no incentive for undercapitalized banks, especially state-
owned banks, to adopt an optimal and safe lending decision.  As a result, many 
Indonesian banks are under a heavy burden of non-performing loans due to their 
hasty lending policy. 
 
Second, the undercapitalized banks are very unstable and in a vulnerable 
position against exogenous variables.  Such circumstance restrains monetary 
policies from being implemented for controlling the aggregate liquidity and the 
foreign short-term capital inflow due to banks with poor domestic capital.  If the 
monetary authority wishes to raise the reserve requirement level with intention to 
decrease the aggregate liquidity, the under-capitalized banks should decrease 
their liabilities as well as their high yield and high-risk assets.  The under-
capitalized bank may experience a dilemma because their soundness was 
exacerbated in addition to the fact that they must meet the 8% capital adequacy 
ratio.   
 
The unique ownership structure of the Indonesian banks has impaired the 
efficiency of the banking system.  Under the Banking Act No of 1992, state-
owned banks have been converted to limited liability companies. To be certain, 
however, the state-owned banks are still state enterprises. The government 
intervenes to allocate loan assets, in order that it mitigate the responsibilities of 
state-owned banks.  This may bring a moral hazard in addition to an inefficient 
use of valuable funds.  The state-owned banks hold a huge amount of non-
performing loans compared to private banks.  On the other hand, many big 
private banks are owned by affiliates of large conglomerates.  Such situation 
has also distorted the financial efficiency of the Indonesian banking system.  
The banks are not interested in maximizing returns for them but rather in the gain 
and loss by the owners of the conglomerates.  Furthermore, they frequently 
violate the permissible limit for lending in order to support their sister companies.  
The permissible limit for lending refers to an exposure to an individual borrower 
that is below 20 percent of the capital.  In addition, the aggregate of the total 
exposure to all affiliated entities must not exceed 10 percent of the capital.   
15 
 
The application of the relevant Indonesian laws to the financial system has 
aggravated the efficiency of the banking system.  There are many aspects of 
law that may render certain issues illegal in the Indonesian financial system.  
The most obvious are collateral laws, which do not provide adequate frameworks 
for corporate restructuring and do not guarantee repayment through disposal of 
their collateral when borrowers go bankrupt. Loan officers of banks are not able 
to make rational decisions that bring the highest economic returns, so they focus 
on the borrower’s political background rather than on the borrower’s collateral or 
credit evaluation under the unreasonable legal system. 
 
In some occasions, the government forces the state-owned banks to lend huge 
amount of funds to strategically targeted industries, such as, the aircraft industry, 
automobile industry, and etc., without considering any economic factors.  The 
state-owned banks are also compelled to lend funds to remotely appropriate 
corporates that are deeply involved with politicians. 
 
 
  Ο Stability of the Banking System 
 
The banking industry is a core sector of the national economy.  The bankruptcy 
of the bank may result in massive disasters which may drastically damage the 
financial stability.  Most Asian people have recognized the significance of 
financial stability through experiencing the Asian foreign exchange crisis in 1997.  
There are many factors, which may work as catalysts to trigger a serious crisis in 
the banking system.  There is a systematic risk that exists in the banking 
system.  One may ask whether there is any possibility that banks default on 
their liabilities. There is indeed such a possibility, as evidenced from what we 
have seen in many cases.  However, this depends mainly on the government 
policy as well as on the legal system.  If so, one may also ask whether there is 
any possibility that such bank’s default will cause other banks to default on 
liabilities of their own.  Likewise, a failure by one bank may induce bank runs on 
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other banks.  A bank’s default, which depends on the governmental policy, may 
be cured by the central bank, which is considered as a lender of last resorts.   
 
What are the potential sources that trigger banks to go bankrupt in the 
Indonesian banking system?  There are a number of factors which may lead to 
a disaster. The few obvious ones are as follows: 
 
First, most Indonesian banks prefer ‘property lending’.  This refers to the banks’ 
lending to property developers, producers of construction materials and 
borrowers whose creditworthiness depends on assets, such as, real estate.  If 
the economic cycle reaches the depression phase or if the bubble of overvalued 
real estate bursts, the borrowers and lenders will immediately go bankrupt.   
 
Second, no one is able to perceive the true situation of Indonesian banks due to 
the lack of transparency of the bank’s balance sheets.  In other words, the value 
of banks may be over-stated compared to its true value through technical 
restructuring which may obscure the poor quality assets. 
 
The Indonesian financial authorities have tried to prevent such potential risks by 
applying a series of remedies 
 
First, the authorities had attempted to strengthen the bank’s capitalization by 
borrowing US$ 307 million in Financial Sector Development Project Loan from 
the World Bank on November 12, 1994 or by granting a government guarantee to 
banks in order that they may raise funds from the international market. 
 
Second, the authorities have encouraged the merging of weak banks into strong 
banks through various inducements, such as, favorable tax treatment, foreign 
exchange license, and etc.  However, the policy of merging troubled banks has 
brought a substantial risk of bank failure on other banks. 
 
Third, the authorities have tried to accommodate good financial infrastructures, 
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which may bring a high level of transparency of bank balance sheets through 
the CAMEL system, i.e., an annual on-site examination of banks by Bank 
Indonesia. 
 
One crucial issue that has been disregarded is the ALM (Asset Liability 
Management).  Generally, banks borrow funds on a short-term basis and lend 
funds on a long-term basis.  This showed that such mismatch could be a 
critical problem during the financial crisis period.  However, such fact has 
continuously been ignored since the banks pay lower costs for short-term 
funding and earn higher profits for long-term loans. 
 
The stability of the banking system is easily affected by macroeconomic shocks, 
such as, the exchange rate or interest rate shocks. The aggregate of foreign 
currency denominated assets and liabilities of Indonesian banks have increased 
rapidly in recent years.  Bank Indonesia limits its net foreign exchange 
exposure to 25 percent of the bank capital.  In reality, the restriction is almost 
ineffective since the valuation of foreign exchange exposure is very difficult.  In 
particular, the assets related exchange rate option written by banks and the low 
net exposure might work large gross exposure.  In fact, Indonesian banks 
have a huge amount of foreign currency denominated loans, which are financed 
by the foreign currency deposits rather than their equity capital.  If the Rupiah 
loses its value massively, serious difficulties will arise and any large default on 
foreign currency loans can depreciate the equity capital of banks. 
 
The increase in interest rates may perturb the bank’s stability.  As the interest 
rates increase, non-performing loans will also increase because of the higher 
interest burden on borrowers.  Meanwhile, the aggregate demand will 
decrease and the business profitability will be reduced. 
  
Another risk that emerged in recent years is the risk of derivative exposure.  
Under the relevant regulation, the bank’s derivative exposure is limited only to 
the extent of its interest rates and exchange rates, in addition to the fact that the 
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potential losses may not exceed 10 percent of the bank capital.  However, 
Bank Indonesia’s control of the derivative exposure is also a doubtful measure 
since the valuation of derivatives is a very complicated task. 
 
 
Table 5. 
On Balance –Sheet Bank Foreign Exposure, 1990/91-1994/95 
                                         (unit: trillion of Rupia) 
 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Current foreign exchange 
            Liability 
29.2 31.4 44.7 57.3 62.5 
Outstanding foreign exchange 
            Credit 
12.3 19.3 23.2 30.4 38.9 
Equity capital 11.9 10.9 13.4 19.8 23.0 
      
Foreign exchange liability/ 
        Equity capital(%) 
246 288 334 289 271 
Foreign exchange credits/ 
        Equity capital(%) 
104 177 173 153 169 
Net foreign exchange credits/ 
        Equity capital(%) 
143 111 161 136 102 
Source: 1. Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial statistics, 1996 
      2. IMF Working Paper, The Indonesian Financial System, 
       John Montgomery, April 1997 
 
 
C. Financial Deepening 
 
Problems in the Indonesian financial sector have deepened with speed after a 
series of financial reforms that have been in force since 1983.  However, 
development is not at a satisfactory level compared to that of neighboring 
countries. Ratios of M1/GDP, M2/GDP, and TAFI/GDP have risen substantially 
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since the 1980’s.  This suggests that the circulation speed and the use of 
money increased as a result of credit creation via financial institutes.  There 
are a number of distinctive characteristics related to the financial deepening of 
the Indonesian economy. 
 
First, the ratio of the stock market value against the GDP rose rapidly. 
 
Second, the proportion of the US Dollar deposit and the share of the banks’ 
credit denominated in US Dollar of the total credit at commercial banks 
increased quickly and reached an apprehensive level.  Because of the weak 
Indonesian economy and the Rupia, the increase in the amount of conversions 
of the Rupia to the US Dollar have made the interest rate become more easily 
alterable by the international interest rate.  Such phenomenon has been 
proven to be a substantially dangerous factor to the Indonesian economy during 
the foreign exchange crisis period. 
 
 
Table 6 
Size of the Financial Sector in Southeast Asia, 1989-94 
                                             (unit: in percent of GDP) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Bank Assets 
    Indonesia 
    Malaysia 
    Thailand 
 
49.3 
92.4 
72.7 
 
60.5 
96.0 
79.2 
 
64.2 
101.9 
82.2 
 
63.0 
95.0 
85.0 
 
58.8 
92.9 
94.6 
 
57.3 
99.9 
109.5 
Bond Outstanding 
    Indonesia 
    Malaysia 
    Thailand 
 
2.7 
66.1 
11.5 
 
1.6 
66.3 
9.9 
 
5.5 
60.6 
8.1 
 
8.9 
55.2 
7.6 
 
9.2 
54.5 
8.2 
 
5.8 
56.1 
9.8 
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Equity Market Capitalization 
    Indonesia 
    Malaysia 
    Thailand 
 
2.4 
105.0 
35.5 
 
7.6 
113.6 
27.9 
 
5.8 
124.4 
36.3 
 
9.4 
162.1 
52.0 
 
22.8 
162.1 
52.0 
 
30.2 
282.7 
94.0 
Source: International Financial Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
      International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, World  
      book,. The Emerging Asian Bond Market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Financial Deepening of Indonesian Economy 
                                                  (unit: %) 
 1988 1991 1994 
M1/GDP 
M2/GDP 
TAFI/GDP 
U$ deposits/M2 
U$ deposits/total credits 
0.10 
0.3 
0.81 
15.5 
4.1 
0.12 
0.44 
0.96 
21.3 
15.6 
0.14 
0.55 
1.01 
17.8 
18.3 
Source: 1. Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics and Annual Reports 
     2. WIDER, Research for Action 27, The banking system and Monetary 
        Aggregates Following Financial Sector Reform, Anwar Nasution,1996 
 
Note: 1. M1 (narrow money) includes currency, coins, demand or checking  
      deposits and other current deposits which are highly liquid 
    2. M2 (broad money) is equal to M1 plus the less liquid savings and time 
    deposits, money market mutual fund shares available for individuals,       
    overnight repurchase agreement and foreign exchange deposits 
  3. TAFI is the total asset of financial institutes 
 
21 
 
 2. The Indonesian Monetary Policy 
 
a. Basic Principle 
 
The Indonesian economy has been oriented to a more market-based monetary 
system.  Among other things, the entrance barrier against the financial industry 
was lowered, many capital controls were removed and a more flexible exchange 
rate system was adopted. As a result, the competition level increased in the 
financial market and the domestic financial market became more integrated with 
the international market.  Such changes show that the stability of the financial 
structure has been shaken by the emergence of the countless financial institutes 
including unstable ones and that the independence of the monetary policy has 
been disturbed to a considerable extent, to the effect that the magnitude of the 
risk on the Indonesian economy has increased. 
 
The financial authorities adopted a more restrictive CAMEL(Capital adequacy, 
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity) system to regulate and to 
supervise banks.  The capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent was imposed on the 
banks.  The authorities also introduced new standard accounting and reporting 
system for banks. 
 
b. Reforms in the Financial System 
 
Table 8 
   Reform in the Banking Industry in Indonesia, 1983-1995 
 
Policy Measures Before reform After reform Date 
I. Competitive Measure 
1. Entry of new banks 
(a)Private banks 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Closed since 1970 
Closed since 1970 
 
Permitted 
Permitted  
 
1988.10 
1988.10 
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2. Branching power 
(a)Private banks 
 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Restricted  1) 
 
Restricted to Jakarta 
 
Permitted to 
 Sound banks 
Permitted to  
 Seven cities 
 
1988.10 
 
1998.10 
3. Foreign exchange 
    License 
Restricted  1) Eligible for 
 Sound banks 
1988.10 
4. Type of loans 
(a) State banks 
 
 
 
 
(a)Private banks 
 
 
 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Mainly the extended 
subsidized credit 
programs, as set and 
refinanced by Bank 
Indonesia 
Free to set 
 
 
 
Free to set 
 
The scope and 
coverage of the 
subsidized credit 
program reduced 
 
20% total credit 
must be extended 
to small business 
2) 
50% total credit 
must be extended 
to export related 
active 
 
1983. 6 
 
 
 
 
1988.10 
 
 
 
1988.10 
5. Types of loans 
(a) State banks 
(a)Private banks 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
1983. 6 
 
 
6. Deposits of public  
   sector 
Restricted to state  
 Banks 
Restricted to state  
 Banks 
1988.10 
7. deposits of state 
   enterprise 
Restricted to state   
 Banks 
Up to 50% with 
 Private banks 
1988.10 
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8. deposit rate 
(a) State banks 
(a)Private banks 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
Free to set 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
1983. 6 
 
 
9. Loan rate 
(a) State banks 
 
(b)Private banks 
 (c)Foreign banks 
 
Controlled by Bank  
 Indonesia 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
Free to set 
 
Free to set 
Free to set 
 
1983. 6 
 
 
10. credit ceiling 
(a) State banks 
(a)Private banks 
 (b)Foreign banks 
 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
Set by Bank Indonesia 
 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
Eliminated 
 
1983. 6 
1983. 6 
1983. 6 
11. Foreign exchange 
   power(limited to     
   licensed banks) 
Subjected to ceilings 
set by Bank Indonesia 
Net open position 
3) 
1989.11 
12. reserve 
   requirements 
15% of deposits 
(differentiated between  
 banks) 
2% of deposits 1988.10 
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13. entry to new activity 
(a)Leasing 
(b)Venture capital 
(c)Securities trading 
 
 
(d)Factoring 
(e)Consumer finance 
(f)Credit cards 
(g)Underwriting  
  shares)  5) 
 (h)Custodian 
 
 (i)Trustee and 
guarantor 
 (j)Securities     
administrative agency 
 (k)Investment Manager 
 
Not regulated 
Not regulated 
Not regulated 
 
 
Not regulated 
Not regulated 
Not regulated 
     - 
 
Not regulated 
 
Not regulated 
 
Not regulated 
 
Not regulated 
 
Subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
Not for own   
 Account, not as  
 Broker/dealer 
Directly 
Directly 
Directly 
Prohibited 
 
Approval required 
for capital market 
Approval required 
for capital market 
Prohibited 
 
Subsidiaries 
1988.12 
    4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Prudential Measures 
1. Capital requirements 
a)Private banks 
 
 (b)Foreign banks 
   (min. 15% domestic  
   ownership) 
 (c)Bank Perkreditan 
   Rayat 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
Rp. 10bn 
Rp. 50bn 
Rp. 50bn 
Rp.100bn 
 
Rp. 50bn 
 
1988.10 
1992.10 
1988.10 
1992.10 
 
1988.10 
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1.Old credit(% of   
bank capital) 
Indivi. Group 
20% 
20% 
20% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
 2. Legal lending limit None 
2. New credit 
 20% of for indivi. 
 & group  
1993. 5 
 
 
 
1993. 5 
1995.12 
1997. 3 
 
 
 3. Loan to deposit ratio None 110% 1991. 2 
    6) 
 4. Capital adequacy  
Ratio 
None  (% of risk 
weighted assets) 
5% by Mar.1992 
7% by Mar. 1993 
8% by Dec. 1993 
          7) 
1991. 2 
 5. Net open position None 25% of capital 1989. 3 
 6. Accounting standard None Standardized  8) 1993. 1 
III. Money market 
Reintroduced in February 1984, SBI is the most important money market 
instrument at present.  On June 1, 1993, the auction system of SBI changed 
from “cut-off rate”(COR) to “stop-out”(SOR).  The private sector commercial 
paper(SBPU) introduced in January, 1985.  Until now, the government has not 
floated treasury bonds in domestic market. 
IV. Transparency and accountability of reporting and management 
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1. To improve banking supervision by (I) standardizing accounting and reporting 
system (ii) requiring commercial bank to submit detailed business plans to the 
central bank and beginning person involved in fraudulent transaction or 
defaulted on significant loans from becoming shareholders, executives or 
member of the board of commissioners of banks. January, 1995 
2.  Banks are required to (I)submit detailed credit recovery plans (ii)standardize 
internal audit system and (iii)adopt standardized information system 
technology. 
 
Notes: 
1) Permitted in principal, but economic and social requirements made it 
prohibited in practice. 
2) Since May 29, can be channeled through other banks and BRPs. 
3) Overseas borrowing for public sector is subject to ceilings set by 
TKPLLN(Coordinating Team for Management of Commercial Offshore Loans) 
since October 1991. 
4) Item (g) to (j) are subject to Ministry of Finance’s Decisions No. 1548 of 4 
December 1990. 
5) Can underwrite bonds and other debt instruments. 
6) Since May 29, 1993, own capital included in the denominator. 
7) In May 29, 1993, this schedule was extended to December 1994. 
8) Standardized - Standar Khusus Akuntansi 
SKAPI(Perbankan Indonesia) – Accounting Standard for Indonesian Banks 
 
Sources.: 
1) Pakto 1988, Pakmar 1988, Pakjan 1990, Pakfeb 1991, Banking Law Number 7, 
1992: Banking Regulation, May 29,1993 
2) Nasution, Anwar, “Financial Institution and Policies in Indonesia” Singapore: 
ISEAS(1983) 
3) David Cole and Betty F. Slade, “ Development of Money Markets in Indonesia”, 
Development Discussion Paper No.371, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 
HIID, in January 1991. 
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4) John Chant and Mari Pangestu, “An Assessment of Financial Reform in 
Indonesia: 1983-90” in G.Caprio, Jr. et. Al., Financial Reform: Theory and 
Experience, mimeo, 1992. 
 
 
c. Liberalization of Foreign Capital Inflow 
 
The Indonesian government has implemented two controversial policies 
regarding foreign capital inflow.   
 
First, the Indonesian government has pursued a balance budget policy.  As a 
result, the government did not wish to bring a budget deficit or to offset the 
government budget deficit by borrowing foreign capital.  Instead, the 
government tried to offset the budget deficit by way of concessionaire foreign aid 
and loans from the Western official creditors.  It was not difficult for the 
Indonesian government to draw an official proceed because Indonesia had held a 
substantial political and diplomatic power for a long time.  The Indonesian 
government has strictly regulated the public sectors from obtaining foreign loans 
(including local government, quasi-government and state-owned enterprises) and 
required approvals from the Ministry of Finance as well as the Planning Agency 
(Bappenas-Badan Perencaan Pembangunan Nasional).  The Bappenas 
controls the allocation of the expenditures for development in the state budget 
and the Ministry of Finance governs the allocation of the routine budget. 
 
Second, the Indonesian government has attempted to attract more foreign capital, 
especially from direct investment by foreign entities.  Although the saving rate of 
Indonesia has been maintained at a relatively high level for the past several 
decades, the investment rate has always surpassed the saving rate due to the 
fact that the Indonesian government had pursued and achieved high economic 
growth during the period.  Thus, Indonesia has always maintained a current 
account deficit.  The Indonesian government had hoped for a foreign capital  
inflow, which would offset the current account deficit, as well as augment and 
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stimulate economic growth.  Foreign capital inflow in the private sector was 
regulated in a relatively less severe manner for the purpose of inducing foreign 
capital.  The government had in fact helped the private sector borrow foreign 
proceeds at a special exchange rate and with the exchange rate swap facility 
assisted by the government, which provided a forward cover. 
 
Furthermore, the Indonesian government lifted a number of restrictions on foreign 
capital inflow in order to attract more foreign capital.  The reforms eased the 
requirements on the foreign exchange transaction for domestic banks and 
opened in considerable scope the domestic economy to foreign banks. 
 
The new rules and regulations replaced the ceiling on the offshore borrowing by 
commercial banks through a system of net open position, and also abolished the 
limit for the inflow of FDI in November 1988.  The NOP regulation requires 
commercial banks to maintain long and short positions of foreign currencies with 
20 percent of their equities.  The short-term foreign capital inflow in the private 
sector (especially commercial banks) increased very rapidly because the 
commercial banks generally take portfolio with short-term borrowing and long-
term lending.  The large-scale foreign capital inflow in the short-term-private 
sector as a result of the reforms played a role in bringing about the rapid credit 
extension and inflation.  The increase in the short-term foreign currency 
liabilities lowered the mobility and vitality of the economy.  
 
The authorities imposed a special quantitative ceiling on offshore borrowing by 
the public sector (including state-owned enterprises) to decrease the short-term 
foreign capital inflow in October 1991.  The ceiling is also imposed on offshore 
borrowing by the private sector which rely on public institutes for raising their 
funds.  But the quantitative ceilings on foreign capital inflow were not 
considered adequate in terms of efficiency because the system inevitably brought 
the rationing of the limited quantity based on a method irrelevant to price. (e.g., 
political favors)  
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The Bank Indonesia eliminated the exchange rate swap, which is perceived as 
an implicit subsidy of short-term foreign capital inflow.  
 
Despite the reforms to restrict short-term foreign capital inflow and to control 
external borrowing, there are substantial loopholes.  The exceptions in the 
restrictions are long-term economic infrastructure projects (including electric 
generating plants, telecommunications, toll roads) and industries substituting 
import (including strategic industries), which are designated by the Ministry of 
Research and Technology.  The designated strategic industries are aircraft (PT 
IPTN), steel mills (PT Krakatau Steel), shipyard (PT PAC), diesel engines (PT 
oma Bisma Indra), heavy equipment (PT Barata), electronics (PT LEN), 
telecommunication equipment (PT INTI), light armaments (PT Pindard), 
locomotive and railway tracks and wagons (PT INKA).  Such industries 
represent an ambitious plan by the Indonesian government that fosters 
strategically industries that are considered that necessary for Indonesia to 
become a developed country by sacrificing an important monetary policy.  
Unfortunately, the Indonesian economy was not equipped with basic 
fundamentals to comply with the policy. 
 
First, there was no incentive for strategic industries to promote quality, efficiency, 
marketability, or etc., because of the government’s protection or guarantee for 
monopoly or oligopoly status. 
 
Second, the pilot companies taken strategic industries were not competitive 
companies but politically involved private enterprises.  Basically, these kinds of 
firms are not capable of producing high quality commodities or service. 
 
Lastly, the development in the Indonesian economy did not reach the level high 
enough to be on track with the high technology industries and there was no 
domestic market capable of upholding the industries 
 
The Indonesian monetary authorities were not able to succeed in controlling 
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foreign debts or in decreasing short-term foreign capital inflow due to the 
unreasonable exception policies. The total amount of Indonesian foreign debts 
surpassed US$130 billion, which contributed, to the foreign exchange crisis in 
1997.  Such exceptions, which had deviated from the basic principle, became 
one of the main causes of the national disaster. 
 
 d. Interest Rate Policies 
 
The interest rate, which consists of the deposit interest rate and the lending 
interest rate, is one of the most important factors that affect the bank’s profit level.  
The gap between the deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate is the 
deciding factor for the bank’s profits.  The interest rate is decided by the 
conditions of the money market, e.g., demand and supply of money or the inflation 
rate since the interest rate is the opportunity cost for holding the money in addition 
to being the expectation money value of the future.  The liberalization of the 
interest rate may be regarded as the first step to the liberalization of financial 
sectors. 
 
The reforms in 1983 endowed the Indonesian banks with full autonomy in deciding 
the interest rate according to the money market condition from the complicated 
ceiling as a result of a selective credit policy and from the repressed credit system 
involving subsidized interest rates.  The following serial financial reforms also 
removed the external barrier in the financial market.  The external deregulation 
increased the capital mobility and sensitivity for the international interest rate. 
 
These reforms caused serious problems: 
 
First, the monetary policy of the government was limited and became complicated 
because of the close correlation between the interest rate and exchange rate.  As 
a result, the authorities had to intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to 
control the interest rate. 
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Second, the Indonesian financial authorities adopted the CAMEL system to 
regulate and to supervise the banking system.  Generally, undercapitalized 
Indonesian banks faced serious problems because the banks could not take high 
risk and high return assets due to CAR.  
 
 
3. The Indonesian Securities Market 
 
 a. Stock Market 
 
The Jakarta Stock Market Exchange (JSE) was reopened in 1977 as part of a 
capital market supervisory agency (Bapepan) under the Ministry of Finance.  The 
JSE was separated from the Bapepan and was privatized on December 4,1991.  
The Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSE) was established on March 30,1989.  The 
Bapepan has a simplified listing procedure and a trading system in the Indonesian 
stock exchange.  The Jakarta Stock Exchange introduced a centralized 
settlement system for all listed securities in June 1994. 
 
The Indonesian Stock market has expanded rapidly in recent years due to the 
development of the market infrastructure, expansion of domestic and foreign 
investor base and improvement in the regulation and supervision in the securities 
market.  However, the Indonesian stock market is still relatively underdeveloped 
compared to that of the neighboring countries as stated in Table 6.  To achieve 
sound and rapid development, the Indonesian stock market must promote 
transparency and fairness in the market, such as, prohibition of insider trading. 
 
There is favorable prospect in the Indonesian stock market since the institutional 
investors are rapidly expanding and many companies are willing to shift their 
funding from bank credit to self-financing, such as, issuing stocks and bonds. 
 
 b. Bond Market 
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The Indonesian bond market was in its infancy prior to 1984.  There were no 
government bonds in Indonesia as the Indonesian government had pursued a 
balanced budget and had offset the deficit through the foreign official assistance 
program.   
 
The capability of the government to control domestic interest rate was weakened 
after the government relaxed controls on bank credit and interest rates because 
the foreign capital movement became interest-rate sensitive.  The financial 
authorities had strong incentive to foster the money market to sterilize foreign 
capital inflow.  Bank Indonesia issued the SBI (Sertificat Bank Indonesia), its 
certificate, in order to sterilize the effects of foreign capital inflow.  The SBI is the 
most important money market instrument in Indonesia.  The private sector 
commercial paper (SBPU-Surat Berharga Pasar Uang) was introduced in 1985.  
It also proved as an ineffective instrument.  But the money market of Indonesia 
did not develop enough to meet the governmental monetary objectives because 
the Indonesian money market was very shallow and narrow.  The authorities had 
no choice but to use a non-market mechanism.  Professor Mr. Sumalin, the 
Minister of Development Planning and Acting Minister of Finance, instructed a 
number of large state-owned companies to convert Rp900billion of their deposit, 
mainly in state-owned banks, into SBI in July 1989.  The second ‘Sumalin shock’, 
was introduced in February 1991 when Mr. Sumalin became the Minister of 
Finance.  He implemented a withdrawal of Rp7 to Rp 8trillion(US$ 3.64billion to 
US$ 4billion at the time) from the monetary base.  The withdrawal amount was 
nearly half the stock of M1.  The financial authorities restored their autonomy of 
the monetary policy through high cost expenses. 
 
Many private non-financial companies have tried to raise funds by issuing bond 
and commercial paper.  To meet the monetary market situation, PT 
Pefindo(Pemeringkat Ef Indonesia), a private rating company, was established in 
1995.  The size and participants of the money market have been increasing in 
recent years.  The secondary market for bonds is still inactive because pension 
funds and insurance companies have held the issued bonds until the maturity date.  
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The market is expected to be more active in the near future as many large state 
and private companies try to diversify the funding source from banks to various 
financial instruments 
 
 c. Institutional Investors 
 
The necessary precondition for capital market development is the growth of 
institutional investors as mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds to 
channel individual saving into capital market.  The Indonesian institutional 
investors are still in its initial development stage.  The Bapepan permitted 
institutional investors to invest a maximum of 85% of net assets in the stock market.  
Though pension funds developed rapidly, they invested 85% of their assets in bank 
deposit.  The investment of institutional investors is not at a satisfactory level yet.  
The high real returns and safety is required in order to induce the institutional 
investors to invest their assets into capital market. 
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Chapter III. The Indonesian Financial Crisis 
 
 
1. Background of the Indonesian Financial Crisis 
 
There are many factors caused the Indonesian financial crisis.  Some people 
believed that the financial crisis occurred suddenly without a distinctive hint by 
international conspiracy.  Such an allegation is very controversial.  However, it is 
not difficult to find many symptoms that triggered the financial crisis.  The most 
important thesis on the Indonesian financial crisis is that Indonesia did not have 
enough foreign reserve to repay its debt.  Namely, Indonesia did not earn enough 
foreign reserve. 
 
The international market was very unfavorable to Indonesia. 
 
First, the competition in the labor-intensive commodity exports became very severe. 
 
Second, the export from China, which is a strong competitor for the Indonesian 
labor-intensive export industry, increased rapidly as the Yuan of China devalued 
about 50 percent in January 1994. 
 
Third, the price of crude oil, one of the most important income sources, dropped 
severely. 
 
The price competitiveness of the Indonesian export commodities was weakened by 
appreciation of the Rupia because the appreciation of US dollar to Japanese Yen 
raised Rupia’s value, which was connected with US dollar’s value. 
 
The Indonesian private sector excessively financed offshore borrowing after serial 
reforms in 1983. 
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Especially excessive short-term foreign debt became a dangerous catalyst and 
excessive foreign capital inflow raised the Rupia’s value extraordinarily, which 
exacerbated the price competitiveness of the Indonesian export industry. 
 
The Indonesian politics, which had maintained its stability for several decades 
under the rules of Mr. Suharto began to tremble as Mr. Suharto aged.  The 
severe forest fire and the long draught caused by the El Nino decreased about 
10% of the rice production and raised the consumer’s price level profoundly.  The 
strong leadership to overcome the crisis had already disappeared. 
 
Table 1. 
Key Indicators of Indonesian Economy: 1990-1996 
                                              (In percent of GDP) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
nternal Stability 
GDP(growth rate) 
Saving rate 
Investment 
Inflation(CPI) 
Fiscal balance 
 
8.9 
26.9 
29.9 
7.7 
0.4 
 
7.2 
26.9 
29.0 
7.8 
0.4 
 
7.3 
27.0 
28.3 
7.4 
-0.4 
 
7.5 
28.4 
30.3 
6.3 
0.1 
 
8.1 
28.0 
31.3 
5.5 
0.8 
 
7.8 
29.3 
32.7 
5.3 
0.2 
External Stability 
Current Account Balance 
Net capital Inflow 
Reserve(in months of imports) 
Short term debt(U$ billion) 
Debt Service Ratio 
Exports of goods(% of growth) 
 
-3.7 
5.0 
4.8 
14.3 
32.0 
13.5 
 
-2.2 
3.8 
5.0 
18.4 
31.6 
16.6 
 
-1.6 
1.7 
5.2 
18.0 
33.8 
8.4 
 
-1.7 
2.0 
5.0 
17.1 
30.0 
8.8 
 
-3.6 
4.3 
4.4 
24.3 
33.7 
13.4 
 
-3.7 
5.0 
5.1 
29.3 
33.0 
9.7 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
       IMF, Annual Report, 1996 and 1997. 
       World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Finance for Developing  
       Countries 1996. 
       World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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 2. Causes of the Indonesian Financial Crisis 
 
a. Macroeconomic Policy 
 
  O Exchange Rate Policy 
 
The exchange rate system with the intervention band has played an important 
role in the Indonesian financial crisis.  The exchange rate has a significant 
impact on exports because it is one of the crucial determining factors of 
international competitiveness. 
 
The Indonesian exchange rate policy has always carefully managed a 
reasonable devaluation of the Rupia to maintain external competitiveness.  The 
authorities devalued the Rupia by 50% compared to the US dollar and replaced 
the US dollar as its external anchor with the managed floating exchange rate 
system.  The weight of the US dollar in the currency basket remained 
substantially under the managed floating exchange rate system.  The monetary 
authorities have basically pursued the devaluation of the Rupia by 3 to 5percent 
annually. 
 
The Indonesian monetary authorities faced the need of an adjustment in the 
exchange rate system because the Indonesian economy, mired in dilemma, 
began to fall apart.  The Rupia was appreciated in the mid-1990s as strong the 
US dollar which was Rupia’s main external anchor.  The exchange rate of the 
Japanese Yen to the US dollar shifted from 85 in 1995 to 127 in 1997.  This 
change weakened the external competitiveness of the Indonesian export industry.  
It destroyed the efficient decision of saving and investment, and thus the valuable 
scarce saving was wasted on unproductive investment projects.  At this juncture, 
the monetary authorities should have selected the floating exchange rate system 
or widened the managing floating exchange rate system.  This move resulted in 
a considerable amount of current account deficit.  Although the authorities were 
37 
aware of the need for change in the Indonesian exchange system, they were 
unable to opt for the alternative, which was sure to bring on high inflation and 
increase of unemployment. As a result, the Indonesian economy faced disaster 
and gave up the exchange rate system with narrow width of adjustment. 
 
 
   m Foreign Debt 
 
The Indonesian economy faced a financial crisis and collapsed languidly in 1997.  
What was the most fundamental cause?  One of the most important factors was 
excessive foreign debt, which surpassed the control capability of the relatively 
small Indonesian economy.  The total amount of external Indonesian debt was 
U$ 134billion.  This was two thirds of GDP and twice the export value in 1997. 
This meant that the Indonesian economy became very fragile against 
unfavorable external changes and was on the verge of collapse. The Indonesian 
government implemented high economic growth policy and eased the restriction 
of foreign capital inflow because they wanted foreign capital and advanced 
technology to help its economic development.  The Western capital was also 
eager to find a profitable market, which guaranteed a high and safe yield.  For 
the West, Indonesia showed promises of profitable investment as Indonesia was 
known for a high economic growth for several decades under the stable rule of 
President Suharto. 
 
The short-term loan was about US$ 68billion in 1997 and most of the short 
external debt (US$ 49.3billion) was borrowed from foreign banks.  The tenure of 
US$ 30billion foreign debt was less than one year.  The average maturity of the 
short-term external debt (US$ 67billion) was about 1.5years.  This appeared as 
a serious problem during the foreign exchange crisis and triggered the collapse 
of the Indonesian economy.  The private sector’s borrowing has increased 
rapidly in the 1990‘s.  Over two-thirds of the bank loans (US$ 33billion) was 
borrowed by the non-financial private sector.  Most of the private sector’s 
external debt was for economic infrastructure projects, which were owned by 
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politically, connected conglomerates, and received implicit and explicit guarantee 
of the government. 
 
The Indonesian government has tried to control the external debt but the 
attempts have proved ineffective. Indonesia established a connecting system to 
obtain and use the ceiling, and abolished the implicit subsidy on the premium of 
exchange rate swap facility, which was implemented to induce foreign capital 
inflow. 
 
   m Current Account Deficit 
 
There are many common characteristics among Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil and  
Russia. 
 
First, these countries have abundant natural resources, and therefore yield a 
considerable trade surplus every year. 
 
Second, they had plans to join the ranks of the advanced countries with 
ambitious investment, and depended on their natural resources, especially crude 
oil. 
 
Third, all of them are holders of foreign debt in high ranking worldwide. 
 
Fourth, all of them have experienced severe setback resulting from their reckless 
avidity.  Indonesia is one of the failure cases proving that advantageous and 
favorable natural environment never guarantees prosperity without rational 
human efforts. 
 
The Indonesian economy has maintained sustainable current account deficit of 
2% of GDP until 1994.  The current account deficit rose to a dangerous level of 
3.7 percent in 1996.  Generally speaking, if the current account deficit of a 
national economy surpasses 4%, the economy will be in danger.  There were 
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many factors, which caused the increase of the current account deficit. 
 
First, the external competitiveness of Indonesian commodities was weakened 
rapidly as China devalued Yuan by 50% and Rupia was over valued due to the 
devaluation of Japanese Yen.  The trade surplus decreased. 
 
Second, the investment rate has always surpassed the high saving rate(about 
30%) because the Indonesian government has pursued a high economic growth. 
 
Third, the private sector borrowed foreign debt excessively after the liberalization 
of foreign capital inflow.  The total amount of foreign debt was about two thirds 
of the GDP.  The debt service ratio was about 34% in 1996.  The use of 
foreign capital was not sound.  To a considerable extent, the proceeds were 
used for infrastructure and other non-tradable industry including land-based 
industry like hotel, tourist resorts, real estates, shopping malls, and so on. 
 
Fourth, the Indonesian government has played an important role in exacerbating 
foreign debt and current account deficit.  The government attempted to 
decrease the burden of repayment of external debt with the proceeds by 
privatizing state-owned enterprises and with expenditure-reducing policy.  The 
policies produced somewhat good results, such as, budget surplus and 
prepayment of expensive foreign debt.  However, they permitted too many 
exceptions such as strategic industries, national car program and excessive 
infrastructure projects.  The budget surplus that resulted from various efforts of 
the Indonesian government was not enough to counter the rapid expansion of the 
off-budget expenditure and government sponsored projects. 
 
 b. Banking Crisis 
 
    m Rapid Increase of Foreign Capital Inflow and Banking Credit 
 
The core of the Indonesian financial crisis was the banking crisis and the core of 
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the banking crisis was the loss of trust to repay debt to foreign creditors.  The 
rapid increase of foreign capital caused a massive current account deficit, and 
therefore, the capability of Indonesian economy to repay debt was questioned.  
Furthermore a huge amount of Non-performing loans struck the banking sector’s 
credit.  Of course, a substantial increase of NPLs was brought about by rapid 
expansion of banking credit.  The Indonesian monetary authorities have 
released many restriction (including interest rate, complicated lending ceiling with 
subsidized interest rate, entrance barrier, and so on) since 1983.  These 
reforms have had a significant impact on the banking industry, and have 
especially promoted competition, as the reforms permitted the participation of 
new banks, foreign banks, NBFIs (Non-Bank Financial Institutes) in the banking 
sector.  These reforms also lifted the restrictions on bank lending, asset 
activities, and [to lend in easier bankable sector as land-based industries. The 
excessive increase of bank credit caused a serious bubble in the Indonesian 
economy and produced disasters like NPLs for banks when the bubble burst.  
Also the excessive bank credit discouraged efficient investment of the Indonesian 
economy because the bank loan officer did not and could not evaluate the 
feasibility of the borrowers’ projects. 
 
The Indonesian financial authorities have been very generous to foreign 
exchange transaction relating to export and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment).  
The serial reforms since 1983 induced a huge amount of foreign capital inflow, 
which reached two thirds of GDP in 1997 as the foreign investors, believed that 
Indonesia was a very stable and promising emerging market.  The foreign 
investors were interested in infrastructure project, working capital of Indonesian 
firms and banks, and capital market to acquire Indonesian companies equity and 
bonds.  The unsustainable level of Indonesian foreign debt meant that the 
Indonesian authorities’ autonomy of the monetary policy was almost lost and very 
fragile against external changes.  Also the rapid and massive capital inflow 
contributed to an increase in the bank credit and to expand the bubble of 
Indonesian economy. 
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  O Serious Mismatch of Maturity and Currency in Indonesian Banking Sector 
 
As one of the distinctive characteristics of Indonesian banks, the Indonesian 
banks have a special asset structure that consists of short-term borrowing and 
long-term lending, and a considerable portion (18% in total debt in 1998) of the 
asset is denominated by foreign currency.  The Indonesian bank’s asset 
structure could be deadly poisonous for banks during the financial crisis. 
 
The serial reforms permitted the Indonesian firms to open foreign currency 
accounts and to take loans denominated by foreign currency from banks.  As a 
result, much of the private sector’s debt was denominated by foreign currency 
and became a substantial danger.  Because the Indonesian Rupia has 
historically shown a stable and predictable value, the danger was not explicit.  
The short-term borrowing and long-term lending provided banks with more profits 
during a peaceful time.  The Indonesian banks tended to prefer the foreign 
currency denominated loan when the domestic interest rate was high due to 
funding cost. 
 
The banks’ asset combination of short-term borrowing, long-term lending and 
high portion of foreign currency denominated asset can be explained as 
undeveloped financial system without sound and capable supervisory institutes.  
The exchange rate of Rupia increased very rapidly from 1997 to 1998.  The 
severe devaluation of Rupia inflicted Indonesian banks with serious disasters.  
The value of banks’ asset decreased rapidly by the devaluation of Rupia because 
of their over valued foreign currency denominated debt.  Most of them did not 
hedge their foreign currency liabilities.  The Indonesian banks had to pay high 
cost to revolve their short-term liabilities during the financial crisis. 
 
The unsound Indonesian banks’ asset structure caused serious liquidity problem 
after the rapid devaluation of Rupia.  Especially the unlisted banks that were 
incapable of raising long-term stable source of funding in the capital market had 
to undergo harsh difficulties.  The high portion of foreign currency denominated 
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lending also increased the burden of repayment burden, especially for their 
customers, which soon connected with increased NPLs.  The Indonesian banks 
were critically hit by the collapse of customers and increased NPLs.  Their 
situation and the path to failure were similar to the case of Korea. 
 
  O Weak Financial Position and NPLs of Banks 
 
Liberalization of the banking sector lowered the capital requirement to enter the 
industry and reserve requirement.  The 22banks (out of 240 banks in total in 
1995) could not meet 8% of the capital adequacy ratio.  The tendency of under-
capitalization was conspicuous in state-owned banks.  The weak capitalization 
of banks has strong correlation with NPLs.  This phenomenon is that of vicious 
circulation. 
 
Generally, undercapitalized banks want high yield and therefore take high-risk 
asset due to their poor financial position.  The risky loan assets are apt to go 
bankrupt easily during a period of economic depression.  The asset became 
non-performing loan and the non-performing loan eroded bank’s capital base. 
 
In the case of Indonesian banking system, there is an implicit guarantee that the 
government will solve the insolvency of state-owned banks through fiscal budget.  
The state-owned banks did not need enough capital base and did not have an 
incentive to liquidate the problem loans at an early stage.  The loan officer was 
quite powerless because they had to just follow governmental instruction; 
therefore, it was very difficult for them to evaluate risks and feasibility of projects.  
As a result, the non-performing loans snowballed in a short time. 
 
  O Government Involvement 
 
Government involvement in the financial sector, meaning the allocation of limited 
resorces via economic policy, is not a peculiar phenomenon limited to Indonesia, 
but a widespread practice in underdeveloped countries.  Many banks have 
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been established since the reform in 1988. The 6 state-owned banks were legally 
transferred to private banks in 1992. 
 
Despite the privatization of many banks, the government still retains a strong hold 
on the ownership of banks.  The government has interfered with all of the bank 
affairs (including personnel, technical affairs).  Of course, the government was 
deeply involved in the loan decision making.  Most of the beneficiaries had 
political connections and were the conglomerates that dominate the Indonesian 
economy. 
 
The financial activities of current decades are quite different from those of 
previous times.  The government officials are not financial experts; therefore 
can not be involved and must not be involved in banking industries. Furthermore, 
generally, their involvement is closely related to black transaction, such as bribe.  
The unnecessary interference of the government distorted and spoiled the 
financial sector.  It was one of important factors which triggered the collapse of 
the Indonesian economy. 
 
The Indonesian financial authorities adopted the CAMEL(Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earning, and Liquidity) system to regulate and to supervise 
bank more prudently in 1991 after the substantial liberalization of the banking 
sector.  However, the restrictive system was not rigorously implemented.  The 
necessary requirements, prudential supervision for the advancement of financial 
system liberalization are not problems of formal regulation but the will of 
regulators for rigorous implementation. 
 
  O The Central Bank: Bank Indonesia 
 
The primary role of the central bank generally consists of three categories, which 
are: issuing and management of domestic currency, supervision for financial 
sector, and lastly, acting as lender of last resort. 
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Though the Bank Indonesia adopted the CAMEL system in 1991, the Indonesian 
financial system lacked a sound market infrastructure.  Some banks relating to 
big conglomerates often-violated limit regulation which restricted lending to 
special related parties like sister companies or owner of banks.  In this case, the 
banks are unable to fairly evaluate their sister companies and their projects; 
therefore, much of the loans for sister companies can be non-performing loan.  
The loan assets mainly came from the deposits owned by the public but there 
was no deposit insurance.  There was always the danger of bank run against 
extremely unfavorable shocks. 
 
Bank Indonesia played an important role as the lender of last resort during the 
financial crisis.  The Bank Indonesia provided distressed banks with equity 
capital injections, liquidity credit, financial supports, and acquired shares of 
problem banks.  The function of the central bank as the lender of last resort is 
to prevent distressed banks from bank run at a crisis.  Many banks depended 
exclusively for their survival on the financial injection from the Bank Indonesia.  
In reality, it is argued that Bank Indonesia is only acting as the lender of last 
resort for state-owned banks and for politically well connected financial institutes. 
 
3. Consequences of the Indonesian Financial Crisis 
 
The Asian financial crisis was triggered by several attacks of international 
speculators.  The Indonesian government asked for the IMF rescue package, 
and the total amount of US$ 40billion IMF rescue package program was signed 
in November 1997. 
 
The Bank Indonesia abandoned the exchange rate intervention band and moved 
to the floating exchange rate system to preserve its external reserve position.  
The external value of the Rupia was depreciated seriously, and the Rupia was 
recorded at 17,000 to a dollar on January 22, 1998.  The composite stock price 
index at the Jakarta Stock Exchange plunged by more than 50 percent from July 
1997 to August 1997.  At the same time, bank deposit and loan interest rate 
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rose to over 50 percent per annum.  Especially the closures of 16 financially 
distressed private banks in November 1997 ignited bank run, panic buying and 
capital flight.  Because of losing confidence from the international financial 
market, the Indonesian banks could not rollover their short-term foreign debt. The 
Letter of Credit issued by the Indonesian banks was also rejected.  The 
Indonesian people experienced harsh distress.  President Suharto resigned in 
May 1998. 
 
 a. Fiscal Stabilization Programs 
 
With the collapse of Indonesian economy in 1997, the Indonesian government 
was forced to implement stabilization policy to decrease budget deficit.  The 
Indonesian government has maintained a balanced budget.  If the budget deficit 
was inevitable, the budget deficit was offset by ODA(Official Development Aid) 
and privatization proceeds.  But everything has changed since 1997, and thus, 
the Indonesian government had to solve the problem of budget deficit which 
imposed heavy pressure directly on aggregate currency and inflation rate.  The 
government had to increase revenue from tax and profits of public enterprises.  
It was very difficult for the government to raise revenue from the private sector 
due to economic recession, rising unemployment rate and high inflation rate. 
 
However there was a huge demand for the government expenditure to pay for 
public external debt, to stabilize consumer price, to lower unemployment and to 
restructure banking sector.  
 
There was the only way to decrease the budget deficit.  The government has 
borrowed a huge amount of money from the central bank to appropriate proceed 
for banking restructuring of IBRA(Indonesia Banking Restructuring Agency).  
The government borrowing from central bank means printing money, which is the 
most soft solution to raise public tax without tax resistance, but which can incur 
many difficult side-effects. 
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 b. Bank Restructuring 
 
  O IMF Recommendations 
 
First, the IMF recommended the Indonesian authorities to merge the weak banks 
to strengthen the banking system. 
 
[ The authorities announced, December 31, 1997, the plan to merge four state-
owned banks(Bapindo, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Bumi Daya and Bank Exim) 
into one entity.  This was followed by the announcement of several banks, in 
January 1998.  Bank International Indonesia(BII), Bank Dagang Nasional 
Indonesia(BDNI), two of Indonesian largest private banks, have agreed to merge 
with three other smaller banks(The Meltdown of the Indonesian Economy in 
1997-1998, causes and response, Anwar Nasution) ] 
 
Second, the IMF recommended the authorities to expand new injection of capital 
including foreigner for bad banks. 
 
Third, the Indonesian government established IBRA(Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency), an independent agency under the Ministry of Finance, to 
implement overall banks restructuring according to IMF recommendation .  The 
IBRA replaced Bank Indonesia’s position as the lender of last resort to itself.  
The central bank was in danger because it spent excessively for the expense of 
budget deficit. 
 
Fourth, the IMF recommended the Indonesian government to operate state-
owned enterprises, including state-owned banks, more accountably and 
transparently.  The evaluation of bank managers should be measured by 
performance contract to evade interference.  The IBRA is mainly engaged in 
supervising distressed banks that need restructuring and managing restructuring 
process.  Another important role of IBRA is to manage the assets required for 
banks restructuring process. The IBRA announced that it suspended 7 banks 
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business operation, took 7 banks management and took control of 
40banks(including 3 state-owned banks, 11 regional development banks, 26 
private commercial banks) under IBRA’s supervision.  The 3 state-owned banks 
were Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Pembanguan Daerah and Bank Dagang Negara.  
The IBRA depended on central bank for raising fund to implement banks 
restructuring process. 
 
Fifth, the IMF recommended that Bank Indonesia, the central bank, have full 
autonomy in formulating and implementing monetary policy. 
 
Sixth, the IMF required the Indonesian government to be equipped with a more 
practicable infrastructure, prudential rules and regulation, regarding the financial 
system.  Its purpose is to strengthen the capability of Bank Indonesia to 
supervise banking industry and to enforce the prudential regulations. 
 
Seventh, the IMF recommended that the authorities explicitly provide full 
guarantee on deposits of all banks in Indonesia to restore confidence of domestic 
and international community on domestic banks.  The policy was expected to 
help foreign banks in accepting the Indonesian bank’s Letter of Credit and to 
prevent bank run. 
 
  O Bank Indonesian Bank-Restructuring Plans in August 1998 
    (EIU Country Report 4th quarter 1998) 
 
Recapitalization 
 
Bank Indonesia will decide which bank may gain capital from the government by 
a financial review of all banks and business plan of selected banks.  The 
selected banks will receive new capital from the owner or other investors 
including the government.  Government participation is temporary and its title of 
ownership is represented by IBRA.  All bank obligations obtained from Bank 
Indonesia liquidity support will be transferred to IBRA, which then converts them 
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into equity or subordinated loans. 
 
* Improvement of rules and regulation 
 
These are amendments to the Banking Act of 1992, submitted to the parliament 
on August 4, 1998.  Bank licensing, previously authorization with the Ministry of 
Finance, will be transferred to Bank Indonesia.  Foreign investors may take 
bank’s share more easily.  The IBRA will be operated at given legal basis. 
 
* Improvement of prudential regulation 
 
Banks are required to meet the capital adequacy ratio of 4% by the end of 1998, 
8% by the end of 1999 and 10% by the end of 2000.  Stricter actions will be 
taken against owners and manager who violate regulations. 
 
* State-owned banks  
 
Bank Exim, Bapindo, Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Dagang Negara and the corporate 
business of Bank Rakyat Indonesia are to be merged into one bank.  Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia(BRI) will concentrate on small credit and retail banking to 
support small-scale enterprise and cooperatives.  The non-performing loans of 
the BRI will be transferred to the Asset Management Unit(AMU) of IBRA. 
 
* Suspended banks 
The assets of the seven banks suspended on April 4, 198 will be transferred to 
the AMU. 
 
* Taken-over banks 
 
Of the seven banks, Bank Danamon, Bank Modern, Bank Umum Nasional, Bank 
BDNI, Bank PDFCI, Bank Tiara and Bank BCA, the operations of three(BDNI, 
Bank Umum Nasional and Bank Modern) will be suspended, while the other four 
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will be retained by the government in order to restructure their capital.  The 
owners of Bank BCA, Bank Danamon, Bank BDNI and Bank Umum Nasional 
wanted to provide fund and assets.  The government set a condition that the 
funds and assets provided by the owners-founders must cover all credits to their 
groups and affiliates as well as BI liquidity support. 
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 c. The External Debt of the Private Sector 
 
Most of Latin-American countries announced moratorium for repayment of 
foreign debt in the early 1980’s.  As a result, those countries could not have 
access to international financial market through 1980’s as a punishment from the 
international community.  The repayment of foreign debt is very important 
because the international capital market remembers the borrower’s behavior for 
a long time. 
 
The total foreign debt was US$ 133.69billion in 1997, of which US$ 67.67billion 
was private sector’s foreign debt and much of them was short-term debt.  The 
Indonesian government proposed to temporally freeze the paying private sector’s 
external debt. 
 
The basic principle of the government policy was not to interfere and to support 
repayment of private sector debt.  The agreement among the representatives of 
government and private sector of Indonesia and the steering committee of 
foreign lenders was reached in June 1998. 
 
[The private sector’s external debt problem is to be solved based on a 
combination of Mexico’s Ficorca program and the Korean scheme.  The Korean 
plan takes the short-term, non-trade debts of Indonesian banks(US$ 8.9billion) 
and restructures them into loans with one to four years maturity.  The non-bank 
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corporate external debt(US$58.79billion) will be rescheduled and restructured 
along the lines of the Mexican programs.  A trust institution, called INDRA, is to 
be established by the government of Indonesia and administered by Bank 
Indonesia(The Meltdown of Indonesian Economy in 1997-1998: Causes and 
Responses, Anwar Nasution) ]   
 
The INDRA(Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency) announced its 8 principles 
for solution of corporate debt.  
 
INDRA is an intermediary institution. 
 
Both the debtor & creditor must agree to its participation in INDRA. 
 
The government shall not assume the responsibility of commercial risk. 
 
The government does not take over and bail out the private sector debt. 
 
INDRA has to be self-financing, to avoid automatic granting of subsidies. 
 
The whole or part of the private debt is eligible for INDRA scheme. 
 
The objective of INDRA is to reduce the burden of short-term external debt 
repayment, which will support the balance of payments condition. 
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INDRA scheme is designed to ease the short-term liquidity problem faced by the 
Indonesian firms.  If any government assumes the private sector’s debt in place 
of the collapsed corporate, both the creditors and corporate will never learn 
lesson from their mistakes. It is understood that the principle of the Indonesian 
government is not to repay the private sectors’ foreign debt as a reasonable way.  
However its policies can be the most regretful thing in the near future because 
the strong countries to which the creditors belong decide the order of the 
international financial market. 
 
 d. Reform of Bankruptcy Law 
 
One of the most notorious things for foreign creditors was the Indonesian 
bankruptcy legal system. The bankruptcy law focused on the protection of 
creditor’s right.  In reality, the law lacked detailed enforcement measures and 
was doubtful of its practicability. 
 
[Though 90% of Indonesian listed corporates are in default, none of them went 
bankrupt.  For example, the Peregrine securities in Hong Kong is in a liquidation 
process because Steady Safe, the Indonesian transportation company, 
announced default for US$ 350million debt from the Peregrine securities.  But 
Steady Safe is engaging in its business as usual(The Economist, The living dead, 
on January 24, 1998)] 
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These kinds of practice cause moral hazard of the borrower and bankruptcy of 
creditors, especially financial institutes.  This issue is one of the main causes of 
the Indonesian financial crisis. 
 
Of course, the foreign creditors made a strong request to the Indonesian 
authorities for the reform of the bankruptcy law.  The new bankruptcy law began 
to be effective after August 20, 1998.  A fair treatment of creditors, whether 
domestic or foreign, is the leading principle of the new laws.  No debtor can 
receive a discharge as a result of either suspension of the payment offer of a 
settlement or reorganization plan to his creditors unless he pays the amount of 
his debts in full or qualified majority must accept the plan. 
 
  O Bankruptcy 
 
In the case of bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor’s assets are liquidated to pay 
the creditors claims according to the ranking of such claims.  The court can 
declare a debtor bankruptcy on a summary finding that the debtor has at least 
two creditors and that at least one of the two debts is currently due and payable.  
The creditor should provide evidence that the debtor has caused to pay his debts.  
There is not any time limit for all debts to be the evidence of the bankruptcy. 
  
Unsecured creditors have no priority and will be paid, if any proceeds of the 
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assets remain after all other creditors have received payment.  They are 
required to present their claims to the court receiver. 
 
Secured creditors have the right to separate the collateral from the debtors  
asset and to enforce against the collateral.  The secured creditors will only 
become involved in the bankruptcy proceedings if the value of the security is not 
enough to cover their claims. 
 
  O Suspension of Payment 
 
This process offers the debtor temporary relief against the pressing creditors in 
order to reorganize and continue his business, and ultimately to satisfy the 
creditors claims.  Suspension of payment can easily be converted into 
bankruptcy when it is clear the reorganization of the business will not be 
successful.  On the other hand, the bankruptcy can not be converted into a 
suspension of payments. 
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Chapter IV. Conclusion 
 
a. Summary of Key Findings 
 
This thesis examined the Indonesian financial system in the context of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The Indonesian financial system has been liberalized broadly and has expanded 
rapidly without an adequate control system.  The liberalization attracted external 
debt and substantially expanded bank credit.  Excessive external debt, 
especially short-term debt impeded autonomy of the monetary policy.  
Extraordinary credit expansion resulted in a huge amount of NPLs.  The 
Indonesian economy finally collapsed because of the crashed financial system, 
irrational exchange rate system, weakened export competitiveness, etc. The 
main problems of the financial system were under-capitalization of banks, 
excessive currency and maturity mismatch of assets, government involvement, 
heavy burden of NPLs, bankruptcy legal system, non existence of prudential 
regulation and supervision, and etc. However, the most fundamental reason was 
the moral hazard of the government and the financial system. 
 
b. Suggestions for Improving the Banking System in Indonesia and Korea 
 
There are many commonalties between Indonesia and Korea regarding the 
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financial crises.  The most salient factor is the deleterious-both external and 
internal- environment of the banking system in the respective countries, which 
has played a very important role in triggering the financial crises.  Above all, 
these factors must be improved for the banking system to contribute to the 
national economy. 
 
    O Internal Reforms 
 
Many people point out the politicians’ and government officials’ deep involvement 
in the deteriorated banking system.  This is true.  But the real responsibility 
belongs to the bank personnel.  Traditionally, the government made decisions 
on lending related to big projects and became involved in all bank affairs, 
especially personnel affairs. Therefore, the bank officers had no incentive to 
carefully evaluate a project and to review customers  credit because they often 
do not have the authorization to reject loan application in those cases.  If a bank 
loan officer wanted promotion, he had to please senior officers and government 
officials.  This is the origin of corruption and distortion of the financial system.  
Here, I would like to suggest two solutions to improve the distorted banking 
system. 
 
First, the evaluation of the bank loan officer should be measured by his 
performance. 
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Second, the banking system should be transformed from a  highly hierarchical 
generalist organization to a flat expert organization.  If a bank officer is an 
expert in a specific field and is evaluated by his performance, he does not need 
to have to worry about his senior’s face and government official’s interference.  
The expert should be equipped with the necessary expert knowledge so that his 
expertise can overcome whatever interference.  The pre-condition of flat expert 
organization is satisfactory economic compensation for the expert instead of 
promotion.  If people do not care about promotion by getting enough 
compensation according to their performance, the external interference can be 
meaningless. This is the first step to disentangle the distorted banking system. 
 
 b. External Reform 
 
The worst thing in financial transaction is default.  If a borrower does not repay 
his debt, he should be punished.  All of his wealth should be confiscated and 
repaid to the creditor.  The borrower should be left to be a beggar without a 
penny after default.  It is the justice of capitalism.  In reality, sometimes the 
borrower in default is financially well off, though he fails to repay his debt.  This 
circumstance may cause a moral hazard because the borrower does not need to 
care about his liability.  These kinds of moral hazard are pervasive in Indonesia.  
It is an outright refusal of the principle of capitalism.  Who dares to do business 
in that circumstance?  Similar nonsense also occurs in Korea very frequently.  
Establishing a systematic apparatus is indispensable as it discourages people 
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from the moral hazard due to severe punishment. 
 
O Indonesia 
 
There are many reasons why the Indonesian economy and the banking system 
collapsed.  But the problem seems to be the moral hazard.  If a person does 
not have to worry about the loss of his all-economic belongings when he 
defaulted on his debt, a rational economic system and a reasonable financial 
system may never be achieved in spite of any official legal system. I examined 
the Indonesian new bankruptcy system in the preceding section.  The new 
bankruptcy law has many implications, which can be the perfect solution to 
restore confidence of the Indonesian financial system and economic justice 
under capitalism.  I do not believe the important thing is formal institutions, but 
rather, the will of the people. 
 
O Korea 
 
The economic environment relating to moral hazard in Korea is not better than 
that of Indonesia.  The GDP per capita level of Korea was more than 10 times 
higher than that of Indonesia before the financial crisis.  Even though the size of 
Indonesia is more than 20 times larger than that of South Korea, the total amount 
of export in Korea is over 2.5 times larger than that of Indonesia.  But I have 
difficulty in judging who is better off in terms of financial system or moral hazard.   
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Korean or Indonesian distressed loan assets can not attract international 
investors at present day.  On the other hand, Thai assets are more popular than 
those of Korean or Indonesian, and Hong Kong companies’ assets are most 
popular in South-Asia.  Some investors indicated that they could forecast the 
future liquidation process reasonably under the Hong Kong legal system.  This 
means the predictability and stability of the legal system are necessary 
conditions to attract international investors. 
 
Most Korean banks accept mortgages for real estate as collateral.  There is a 
certain ranking among collateral, where the ranking is registered in court.  The 
mortgage principle, to which advanced creditor has priority over appropriating 
debtor’s asset for his credit.  The principle is very important for the financial 
institutions as it decides their portion when the debtor collapses. 
However, the principle is ignored very often, which means that the ranking of 
mortgage is meaningless.  If any big corporation is in default, it will mostly go to 
composition or court receivership instead of the liquidation process.  This 
means that a creditor can not take his credit according to the mortgage ranking 
and the debtor can maintain his business and assets.  I think that the Korean 
court abuses composition and court receivership, and its decision spoils the 
economic justice.  The abuse of composition or court receivership caused 
serious moral hazard of corporate and financial institutes. 
 
First, the corporation do not fear forceful deposition of his assets by bankruptcy.  
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The government always protects their business and assets, and bails out their 
debt.   Korea is a heaven for an immoral corporate owner. 
 
Second, financial institutions should always look over their mortgage ranking 
carefully.  If they are subordinated rankers in mortgage, they have to check 
carefully the debtor’s credit and the feasibility of projects.  But the principle is a 
ridiculous one because mortgage ranking is generally meaningless when big 
corporation go bankrupt.  The Korean financial institutions do not have the 
incentive to evaluate debtor’s credit and project because there is no difference 
between the senior ranker and subordinated ranker. 
 
To develop a sound financial system, all of the above should be fundamentally 
improved. 
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